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COMMENTS
EXCITED UTTERANCES AND PRESENT SENSE
IMPRESSIONS AS EXCEPTIONS TO THE
HEARSAY RULE IN LOUISIANA
The 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure stipulated that "Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided in
this Code."' No definition of hearsay evidence is provided statutorily, but it appears that Louisiana courts generally follow the
rule that "an assertion made by a person not testifying at the
hearing and offered as an assertion to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, is hearsay evidence and inadmissible" unless
it falls within various recognized exceptions to the rule.2 This
definition corresponds substantially to that given in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence.'
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are numerous. The Uniform
Rules, for example, list thirty-one separate exceptions. It is generally recognized that excited utterances and present sense impressions are admissible as two of these exceptions to the hearsay
exclusionary rule.4 The Uniform Rules provide that statements
made while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous
excitement, caused by his perception of a certain event or condition, are admissible as excited utterances.5 And statements
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition
which the statement narrates, describes, or explains are said to
6
be admissible as present sense impressions.
Wigmore carved out and articulated the exception for excited utterances. He was the first to point out the "necessary"
nature of such statements and that the spontaneity, produced
by the exciting event or condition, minimizes the risk of un1. This provision is now carried forward as LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950).
2. Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611, 624 (1954).
3. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 63 (1953).

4. The writer has purposely chosen to use the term "excited" rather than the
term "spontaneous" in describing utterances of emotion which may be admitted as
exceptions to the hearsay rule, although the two adjectives are often, used interchangeably. This was done in an attempt to avoid confusion between spontaneous
utterances and contemporaneous ones and to assure that the two requirements are
not merged in the reader's mind as concomitant prerequisites to the admission of
hearsay evidence under these exceptions. Merger of the two notions-each in itself
supposedly a guarantee of trustworthiness-has occurred in some jurisdictions,
making admission of hearsay evidence under the exception contingent on its contemporaneous nature as well as its spontaneity. See, for example, the discussion in
Harper, Res Gestae in the Georgia Law of Hearsay, 5 MERCER L. REv. 257 (1954).
5. UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 63(4) (b) (1953).
6. Id. rule 63(4)(a).
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reliability. 7 The excited extra-judicial assertion is more valu-

able to the trier of fact than statements made at the time of
trial by the declarant after he has had ample opportunity to
reflect upon the exciting event or condition. The excitement
prompting the utterance minimizes the risk that there will be a
fabrication by the declarant. In the case of present sense impressions, the contemporaneous nature of the remark likewise
reduces the danger of fabrication, since such statements are
made while the declarant is observing the event.8 The admission
of both excited utterances and present sense impressions is said
to be necessary since it is impossible for the trier of fact to
recreate the exciting condition and thus to recapture the moment at which the declarant spoke. 9
It is the purpose of this Comment to discuss the extent to
which Louisiana recognizes these exceptions; and, if such statements are admitted, to discover the rationale used by Louisiana
courts to admit them. Its scope is intended to encompass the
admission of excited utterances and present sense impressions
in both criminal and civil cases. Prior to 1928, Louisiana rules
of evidence were said to be identical in both types of trials.10
In that year, a code of criminal procedure was adopted, setting
forth a number of evidentiary rules." The impact of this code
7. 6 J. WIoMoRE, A TREATISE ON TILE ANGLO-AMERICAN
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1748-1749 (3d ed. 1940) :

SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE

"There must be some

occurrence, startling enough to produce nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting." It was further required that there be no time
to recover from the startling event and thus little chance to fabricate details about
it. Therefore in the case of remarks made subsequent to the exciting event, time
was said to be a very important factor insofar as determination of spontaneity
and thus of reliability was concerned. Later commentaries on the Wigmore analysis
have pointed out that the guarantee of reliability through excitement may well be
self-defeating. Most writers have concluded that as the mental stress or excitement
of an observer or participant increases, the accuracy of perception through his
senses decreases. What the statement gains in honesty, it may well lack in accuracy. See Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928). Most courts, including those in Louisiana, appear to
be unimpressed with such sophisticated arguments and have continued to admit
excited utterances with very little regard for the nature of the excitement and its
effect on accuracy. Apparently, it is felt that these statements are invaluable for
the trier of fact and that deficiency of perception -by the declarant is not much
greater than that of the ordinary witness.
8. See, e.g., Emens v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 223 F. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915) (fatal
accident at railroad crossing; declarant was wife, sitting in automobile with her
husband, watching the train. Husband was permitted to report wife's question,
"Why don't [sic] the train whistle?"). Present sense impressions are also often
reasonably reliable because the declarant's perception of the event or condition can
be verified by the perception of the reporting witness, who must have been at
least within earshot of the declarant if not immediately at his side.
9. Slough, Res Gestae, 2 KAN. L. REV. 246, 251 (1954).
10. State v. Wilson, 163 La. 29, 111 So. 484 (1927). See authorities cited
in Comment, 14 LA. L. Rv. 568, 571 nn.15-18 (1954).
11. Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 568, 571-79 (1954).
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on evidentiary rules in civil cases is unclear. But this has not
been a matter of great concern to Louisiana courts, probably
because evidence rules are more liberally applied in Louisiana
civil cases than in criminal cases. Since appellate courts in this
state may review both the rulings of law and the findings of
fact in civil cases,1" a request by either party for trial by jury
in such cases is the exception rather than the rule.13 Thus there

is less danger of prejudice or of uncorrectable error in the admission of hearsay evidence in Louisiana civil cases, and little
reason to impose the strict common law evidence rules designed
for use in jury trials.1 4 Most of the discussion of admissibility
of evidence in Louisiana is found in the appeal of a criminal
defendant, whose life or liberty is at stake.
DISTINGUISHING RES GESTAE

It would be impossible to discuss excited utterances and present sense impressions as separately recognized exceptions to
the hearsay rule without first facing the problems surrounding
the use of res gestae, the area from which both exceptions were
apparently carved.:, There is probably no single legal term which
has been more criticized than this broad and amorphous concept, used by courts to admit all kinds of evidence, testimonial
as well as real.16 Without exception, authorities have roundly
12. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
13. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1781-1733, including the preliminary statement
to Chapter 7, the chapter in which these procedural articles are to be found.
14. Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 568, 579 (1954). It should also be noted in
these prefatory remarks that under Louisiana law, more liberal evidence rules prevail in workmen's compensation cases where the court is not generally "bound by
technical rules of evidence." LA. R.S. 23:1317 (1950). Hearsay evidence is readily
admitted in workmen's compensation cases and the formalities surrounding the
various exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rules are obviated. See Manues v.
Ships & Power, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. La. 1960) ; Clifton v. Arnold, 87
So.2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956). See also Mancuso v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture
Co., 183 So. 461 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) ; Champagne v. Welsh Motor Car Co.,
150 So. 35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
The rationale behind the more lenient evidence rules in workmen's compensation cases, in addition to the absence of jury trials, is the frequency of accidents
in which little or no evidence is available apart from the workman's testimony at
the time of trial and statements at the time of the injury or soon thereafter. LA.
CODE CIv. P. art. 1733(2). For the best statement of this rationale, see Jacobs v.
Village of Buhl, 199 Minn. 572, 577, 273 N.W. 245, 247-48 (1937) : "In every
small city and hamlet there is a policeman working alone at night. Night watchmen
work alone. Other employees work alone. These employees are subject to numerous
possibilities of accidents which may cause conditions that 'bring about their death.
They do not have a witness with them to furnish proof as to the happening of the
accident if the injuries they receive close their lips in death . . . [To] give a strict
application of the res gestae rule in compensation cases would defeat the intent
of the Workmen's Compensation Law."
15. C. McCoRIucK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 272-273 (1954).
16. State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546 (1962) (rape case; pictures
of victim in hospital showing bruises and cuts where she was beaten held admissi-
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condemned continued use of the phrase while noting its useful7
ness in previous development of evidence law.'
The term might have maintained some integrity if it had
been strictly confined to situations in which the out-of-court
statement is a part of the "things done" and is thus not hearsay
at all.' But Louisiana courts as well as many other courts have
often failed to distinguish carefully between hearsay and nonhearsay statements entering under the res gestae exception, and
great confusion has resulted. 19 And into the convenient hamper
of res gestae has also gone evidence actually falling under the
now recognized exceptions for excited utterances and present
20
sense impressions-usually with no pause for discussion.
Through application of the discerning analysis of Professor
ble as res gestae) ; State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496 (1950) (clothes of
deceased admitted as part of res gestae to connect accused with commission of the
crime) ; State v. Harris, 45 La. Ann. 842, 13 So. 199 (1893) (testimony by son
of deceased that he returned to home of accused to recover a portion of his father's
ear torn off in the struggle and that accused stamped on the object of his search
and would not release it to him held admissible as part of res gestae). But see
State v. Sears, 217 La. 47, 46 So.2d 34 (1950) (evidence of unlit half of marijuana
cigarette found in search of apartment after officers arrived held inadmissible as
part of res gestae and prejudicial to accused in his murder trial).
17. Wigmore calls the phrase "not only entirely useless, but even positively
harmful." 6 J. WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1767 (3d ed. 1940). Thayer was of the opinion that the term was first used by "Garrow and Lord Kenyon-two famously ignorant men" and that it was a "catch-all" for some things which belonged there
and others which might 'be put there for "purposes of present convenience." Thayer,
Bedingfield's Case, 15 AMi. L. REV. 1, 10 (1881) ; J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 207,
245 (1908). Judge Learned Hand felt that res gestae was "a phrase which has been
accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever
in legal terminology." United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
18. See Comment, 42 ILL. L. REV. 88, 93 (1947).
19. In Louisiana, the res gestae exception is covered by LA. R. S. 15:447
(1950), which states: "Res gestae are events speaking for themselves under the
immediate pressure of the occurrence, through the instructive, impulsive and
spontaneous words and acts of the participants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the events. What forms any part of the res gestae is always
admissible in evidence." And id. 15:448 provides: "To constitute res gestae the
circumstances and declarations must be necessary incidents of the criminal act,
or immediate concomitants of it, or form in conjunction with it one continuous
transaction." For examples of non-hearsay evidence admitted under res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, see State v. DiVincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957)
(telephone call occurring in the process of a raid on gambling establishment admitted as res gestae without discussion of its character as hearsay or non-hearsay) ;
State v. Rice, 159 La. 820, 106 So. 317 (1926) (defendant on trial for liberation
of prisoner; conversation between witness and prisoner asking if prisoner could
speak to defendant as he drove by, admitted as res gestae without analysis). Cf.
State v. Corcoran, 38 La. Ann. 949 (1886) (deceased's request to friends to go
with him to find defendant and beat him fifteen minutes before fatal struggle excluded as hearsay and not part of res gestae).
20. See, e.g., the recent case of State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729
(1967), which seems to contain both, entering under what the court calls an extended res gestae doctrine. It must be admitted that the Louisiana legislation encourages this by lumping res gestae and spontaneity in the same statute, LA. R.S.
15:447 (1950).
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Edmund M. Morgan, it is now possible to suggest a return to
the non-hearsay use of the term res gestae. 21 Hopefully, this may
serve as a means of removing some of the confusion presently
surrounding the broad use of res gestae in Louisiana. This suggestion is not intended to narrow the scope of admissibility of
relevant and otherwise competent evidence, but rather through
more precise analysis generally to broaden admissibility by
placing each form of evidence in the category in which it can
best serve the interests of the trier of fact. In many instances,
Louisiana already follows Professor Morgan's analysis, as will
be seen below.
Morgan suggests first that out-of-court statements which are
themselves operative facts, creating legal relationships, should
be admitted as res gestae since they are not admitted for the
truth contained therein but merely to prove that they were in
fact made. In an action for breach of contract, a statement of
acceptance or repudiation of the offer would of itself alter the
legal relationship between the parties; or in a libel action, the
defamatory statement itself-if made-would alter the existing
22
legal relationship between the parties.
Morgan suggests secondly that a statement which gives
meaning to otherwise ambiguous conduct may be admitted, not
for its truth, but as an intrinsic portion of that conduct necessary for its explanation to the trier of fact.2 3 If A testifies that
he saw B give $100 to C, saying as he did so, "Here's $100 as
a loan, but I expect repayment when you are back on your feet,"
his testimony is admissible to show that the transfer was a loan
rather than a gift. The out-of-court utterance is not hearsay but
4
actually a part of the act done.2
21. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91 (1937) ; Morgan, A Suggested
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
22. For an example in Louisiana, see State v. Forsythe, 243 La. 460, 144 So.2d
536 (1962) (prostitution; conversations ;between girls and members of the vice
squad prior to going upstairs to rooms where arrests were made held admissible
as part of res gestae).
23. Some would call this the verbal part of an act, or simply "verbal act."
See, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EviDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1772 (3d ed. 1940) ; Slough, Res Gestae, 2
KAN. L. REV. 246, 273 (1954). This phrase, like its Latin cousin res gestae, suffers from the burdens born of faulty analysis.
24. See Comment, 42 ILL . L. REV. 88, 91 (1947). In Louisiana, see State v.
Fernandez, 157 La. 149, 153-54, 102 So. 186, 187 (1924) (statements by robbers
to each other during robbery admitted; the court said: "This testimony was not
hearsay, but clearly formed a part of the res gestae.") ; State v. Terry, 128 La.
680, 55 So. 15 (1911) (sale of intoxicating liquor; conversation between witness
and drugstore clerk as to how they could "manage" getting witness a bottle of
liquor by sending him to defendant doctor for a prescription held admissible as res
gestae) ; State v. Gessner, 44 La. Ann 93, 10 So. 404 (1892) (theft; accused's
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Morgan further suggests that a statement may be admitted
as circumstantial evidence of other facts, not for its own truth.
Usually such a statement is important in a case in which the
material fact to be proved is the state of mind of the person to
whom the statement is communicated. He gives the example of
a defendant charged with bigamy whose defense is that his
first spouse had been absent for seven years and that he contracted his second marriage in the good faith belief that his
first wife was dead. Testimony by A that he heard B tell defendant, a few months prior to the second marriage, that C
had recently seen his spouse, is clearly admissible on behalf of
the State on the issue of defendant's good faith and as such is
25
non-hearsay.
Morgan's fourth category consists of statements which are
circumstantial evidence of intent.
"Where a resident of X, while removing therefrom to Y,
utters imprecations upon X and all its inhabitants, either
reverently or blasphemously calling down upon them the condemnation of the Almighty [and] domicile is in issue, the
hostility of the declarant is circumstantial evidence of his
intent to abandon X as his residence, and his utterance is
''2 6
circumstantial evidence of his hostility.
Limitation of the res gestae exception to these clearly nonhearsay utterances may help to clear the area around the exceptions of excited utterances and present sense impressions
which, while hearsay because they are out-of-court utterances
offered for the truth of the statements contained therein, should
be admissible on the grounds of necessity and reliability. Res
gestae as above outlined would not include two generally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule: actual statements of intention as presently existing mental states27 and statements of
representations that he was a gas inspector made in order to gain admittance to
the house admissible because made within the crime and therefore a part of res
gestae).
25. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.. 229, 232 (1922). The same testimony would clearly be inadmissible if offered only to prove that the wife was alive or dead.
26. Id. at 233. Two Louisiana cases admitted statements either directly stat-

ing intent or circumstantial evidence of intent. In State v. Smith, 171 La. 452,
131 So. 296 (1930), a stabbing case, the trial court properly admitted defendant's
remark to a witness as the victim approached, "I ought to kill him" as part of

res gestae; and in State v. Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182, 16 So. 745 (1895), a murder
case, the defendant's statement that he would "put 14 'buckshots" into the deceased was properly admitted as res gestae, preceding the killing by only "a short
time." See also Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
27. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(12) (a) (1953). It is of academic
interest only that on this exception alone the analysis of the authors of the Lou-
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presently existing physical conditions made to physicians for
purposes of treatment or for diagnosis with a view toward
treatment. 8 Whether one treats such statements as non-hearsay
and thus not subject to the exclusionary hearsay rule2 9 or as
hearsay but admissible under these recognized exceptions, they
should not be confused with res gestae statements as outlined
above.
The proclivity of Louisiana courts for admitting non-hearsay
statements, excited utterances and present sense impressions
under the heading "res gestae" without analysis or discussion,
indicates that the term is indeed too broad. Rather than add one
small voice to the many cries raised in the past for the abolition
of the term and its relegation to a spot on the musty shelves of
interesting legal history, the author suggests a more realistic
compromise. Since use of the term is so firmly embedded in
Louisiana jurisprudence and not likely to be completely erased,
it is suggested that its use be limited to those non-hearsay statements outlined above, when these are the res in issue.
EXCITED UTTERANCES

Now that an attempt has been made to put to one side the
statements admissible under the heading of res gestae, attention may be focused upon the treatment of excited utterances
by Louisiana courts. It is clear from the very nature of the exception that there must be some excitement to prompt a reliable
utterance. The nature of the excitement and the degree of emotion involved, however, are matters to which Louisiana courts
have not paid a great deal of attention. The majority of Louisiana cases in which the matter is raised involve shootings, stabbings, and automobile accidents-certainly startling enough in
themselves-but there is authority in Louisiana for accepting
somewhat lesser degrees of excitement.2 0 The nature and degree
of the excitement seems to be the most important among many
isiana comment on hearsay evidence parts company with the analysis of the commissioners of the Uniform Rules. The statement, "I intend to go to Crooked
Creek," when offered to tend to prove that the declarant had actually gone there,
if admissible, would be treated as non-hearsay by Crawford and Frisby, the Louisiana authors. The Uniform Rules treat the same statement as hearsay but
admissible under this recognized exception. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
145 U.S. 285 (1892).
28. Id. rule 63(12) (b).
29. This is the treatment given by the authors of the Louisiana comment on
hearsay evidence. See discussion in note 27 supra.
30. Anzene v. Gulf Public Serv. Co., 198 So. 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939)
(statement made after explosion of coke bottle in plaintiff's hand held properly
admitted as part of res gestae).
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factors considered by Louisiana courts to determine whether
the risk of fabrication in the out-of-court utterances is so small
that it can be admitted with little danger of prejudice. When
our courts have found that the exciting event and other surrounding circumstances "were not such as to preclude the possibility of design, deliberation or fabrication," extra-judicial
31
assertions prompted by that event have been excluded.

Since it is felt that the excitement serves to produce reliability-or, better, to reduce the risk of fabrication-prolongation of the excited condition for some reason may well permit
admission of statements so long after the event that they would
otherwise be deemed inadmissible as untrustworthy.32 In a recent Louisiana criminal case, the Supreme Court affirmed the
admission of certain statements by an abortion victim during
her twenty-four-hour period of intermittent pain before she
died.3 3 But where the prolongation of the excitement is not sufficient to reduce the risk of fabrication to an acceptable minimum, excited statements have been excluded. Statements made
by an injured man after two hours in pain,3 by another after
being unconscious for fifteen minutes,35 and by another after
"an unknown period" of being unconscious 3 6 were all excluded,

ostensibly on the ground that the excited condition might well
have subsided3 7and too great a risk of fabrication was once
again present.
Where the excited statement is made by a bystander rather
than a participant in the exciting event, most courts have been
31. Ellis v. Edwards, 183 So. 116, 118 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
32. In an extreme case in the State of Washington, there was some question
as to whether a boy stealing a ride on a street car fell off or was thrown off by
the conductor. In either event, the boy was seriously injured and was unconscious
for eight days. When the boy regained consciousness lieturned at once to his
mother and said that the conductor had kicked him off the car. That statement
was admitted; the court said there had been no time for reflection or fabrication.
Britton v. Washington Water Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 P. 20 (1910).
33. State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967).
34. Ellis v. Edwards, 183 So. 116 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
35. Holland v. Owners' Auto. Ins. Co., 155 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
36. Bionto v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 125 La. 147, 51 So. 98 (1910).
37. In the Ellis case, the declarant seemed to be calm and deliberate when
making his statements even though he was in great pain at the time. In that case,
the court found certain discrepancies in the physical evidence which led it to disbelieve the plaintiff-declarant's version of the events. In the Holland case,
plaintiff-declarant was a young boy injured in a taxicab accident. Plaintiff and
the cab driver were the only witnesses for his side in the suit against the insurance company; all other witnesses gave a different version of the accident and of
plaintiff's condition. The court apparently did not believe the plaintiff. In the
Bionto case, the fact that declarant was the only witness to his accident and that
he seemed calm and deliberate in his statements led the court to believe that the
risk of fabrication in his statements was high.
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more reluctant to admit it. Apparently, it is felt by some courts
that disinterested onlookers will be less excited by the occurrence
and thus the risk of fabrication will be increased. 3 In very early
cases, Louisiana adopted the more progressive position of admitting bystanders' statements if there were few indications of
fabrication39 Later a series of cases excluded certain excited
statements ostensibly for the very reason that bystanders had
made them. 40 But more recent cases have once again indicated
that the fact that the statement sought to be admitted was made
by a bystander is only one element to be considered by the trial
41
judge in measuring the risk of fabrication.

One way in which some courts have sought to minimize the
danger of fabrication in the admission of excited extra-judicial
assertions is to exclude statements which appear to be purely
narrative or those given in response to questions. These courts
reason that since these statements tell about the event rather
than permit the event itself to speak through the declarant,
there is a greater danger of fabrication and exaggeration in
the telling42 It is submitted that such reasoning confuses the
excitement prompting the statement with the element of spontaneity. The condition which is said to minimize the danger of
fabrication is the excitement, and thus the form of the statement-whether it be purely spontaneous, narrative or in response to questions-should not bar its admission2.4 Fortunately,
the prevailing rule in Louisiana and elsewhere seems to be that
38. Wigmore, however, clearly rejects any limitation which would exclude
excited utterances for the sole reason that they are made by bystanders. 6 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AmiERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1755 (3d ed. 1940). New York, it has been stated, is one of
the jurisdictions which excludes statements by bystanders, showing that it is "more
willing to receive the declaration of a party to the accident, who has an interest
in the outcome of the case, than the declaration of a bystander, who has no interest in the suit, but who may have been emotionally moved by the concurrence."
Mackston, Res Gestae in New York, 8 INTRA. L. REV. 115, 122 (1953).
39. State v. Corcoran, 38 La. Ann. 949 (1886) ; State v. Moore, 38 La. Ann.
66 (1886) ; State v. Borton, 33 La. Ann. 289 (1881).
40. State v. Bellerd, 50 La. Ann. 594, 23 So. 504 (1898); State v. Riley,
42 La. Ann. 995, 8 So. 469 (1890) ; State v. Oliver, 39 La. Ann. 470, 2 So. 194
(1887). Contra, State v. Desroches, 48 La. Ann. 428, 19 So. 250 (1896). A numher of these exclusions may have been based on the court's belief that the bystanders' utterances were opinions rather than statements of fact.
41. State v. DiVincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957); State v. Compagno, 230 La. 657, 89 So.2d 158 (1956).
42. Some courts seem to have carried this to the extreme in automatically
excluding statements which appear to have been made in response to questions
propounded to the declarant by the reporting witness or by others subsequent to
the startling event. Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1966).
43. Nor should the content of the statement be a reason to exclude it, if the
statement is found to have been prompted by sufficient excitement. Some authorities have felt that the statement must elucidate the occurrence itself rather than
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the fact that the statement was made in a narrative form or as
an answer to a question is merely one factor to be considered
by the judge in determining whether the risk of fabrication in
the statement is so small that it can be admitted. 44 Accordingly,
where the danger of unreliablility is found to be small because
of great excitement, Louisiana courts have admitted narrative
statements or statements made in response to questions. 45 Where

the court finds little risk of fabrication, even the affirmative
nod of a shooting victim unable to speak, given in response to
the witness's question supplying the name of the accused, can
be admitted.41 Answers to questions given in a calm and delib-

erate manner some hours after the exciting event have been
excluded, however,
apparently because the danger of fabrica47
tion was great.
refer to some prior matter. 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE OF TIE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEMI OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§§ 1750,

1754 (3d ed. 1940).

But it has 'been pointed out that such a requirement confuses the content of the
statement with its character. If excitement reduces the risk of unreliability, then
the subject matter of the excited statement should not really be of great concern
to the trier of fact. Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead, 90 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937)
(plaintiff slipped and fell in grocery store; grocery clerk who came to her assistance said he was sorry, that the floor had 'been littered with vegetables for "a
couple of hours," but he had been too busy to clean it up. The court of appeals
said the statement was properly admitted). See Slough, Res Gestae, 2 KAN. L.
REV. 246, 262 (1954). It does not appear -that Louisiana courts require that the
excited utterance elucidate the event itself. But see the recent case of State v.
Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967), in which the court announced without
reference to Louisiana cases that excited statements are admissible "provided
they, in some way, illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act ..
"
44. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 272

(1954).

45. Criminal cases: State v. Williams, 158 La. 1011, 105 So. 46 (1925)
(more than fifteen minutes after event) ; State v. Williamson, 145 La. 9, 81 So.
737 (1919) (probably five to ten minutes after event) ; State v. Foley, 113 La.
51, 36 So. 885 (1.902) (fifteen seconds after event) ; State v. Carter, 106 La. 407,
30 So. 895 (1902) (very short time) ; State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 541, 27
So. 129 (1900) (thirty seconds after event). Civil cases: Lanis v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 140 La. 1, 72 So. 788 (1916) (five minutes after event). The questions
themselves, of course, are admissible as non-hearsay to make the answers intelligible.
46. State v. Maxey, 107 La. 799, 32 So. 206 (1902) (nod was made two
minutes after the shooting; court said this was admissible as part of the res
gestae).
47. State v. Bussey, 162 La. 393, 110 So. 626 (1927) (poisoning; questions
to little girl in hospital twenty-eight hours after event and her answers excluded
because they seemed to be calm, deliberate responses not provoked by excitement).
Admission of statements in response ,to questions may be limited in some jurisdictions by the fact that the declarant is only a witness to the startling event
rather than the actual victim. This is a further indication of the skepticism with
which the courts view the degree of excitement present in a non-participant. See
State v. Ramsey, 48 La. Ann. 1407, 20 So. 904 (1896), where the admission of
the statement of the witness to a fatal shooting in response to questions from
persons in another room was judged error. Q: "What is the matter 'back there?"
A: "Nick Ramsey shot Jim Moffit, and shot him down for nothing." It appears
the exclusion of this evidence, however, was based more on the fact that it expressed the declarant's opinion as to the guilt of the defendant rather than the
fact that it was given in response to a question.
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Another factor considered by Louisiana courts and those in
common law jurisdictions in weighing the risk of fabrication
in an excited utterance is the elapsed time between the exciting
event and the statement. It is not required that the excited
utterance be contemporaneous with the startling event, either
in Louisiana or in the majority of other jurisdictions. 48 Nor is
there an absolute time limit beyond which no statements will be
admitted; each case must turn on its own facts, and the circumstances must be such as reasonably to minimize the risk
of fabrication of details about the event.49 When the courts have
found little opportunity to fabricate or little indication of design or deliberation, statements up to twenty-four hours after
the event have been admitted. 5° But when it appears that there
is a substantial likelihood that statements made by an injured
person may have been fabricated, as in State v. Chandler,51
utterances made as soon as ten minutes after the event may be
excluded. If it should appear that the out-of-court declarant
carefully chose the witness to whom he made his statement,
there is an indication of reflection and of fabrication.52 Thus
it is submitted that though most of the discussion in excited
utterance cases centers around the time element, the passage of
time is important principally because it bears on the question
of the risk of reflection and fabrication, which is the real core
of the problem of admissibility under this exception. 53 In most
48. To do so would be to merge Wigmore's excited utterance exception with
Thayer's contemporaneous impression exception, thereby making it difficult to get
in statements of either kind and creating a "legal conglomeration which neither
Thayer nor Wigmore would have countenanced." Slough, Res Gestae, 2 KAN. L.
REv. 246, 258 (1954). But see State v. Willis, 241 La. 796, 131 So.2d 792 (1961),
where it was said that the words must be "nearly contemporaneous" with the act.
See also the discussion of present sense impressions as a separate exception to
the hearsay rule in text accompanying note 80 infra.
49. State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So.2d 262 (1950).
50. State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967). See also workmen's
compensation cases, Temple v. Martin Veneer Co., 200 So. 676 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1941) (some hours after accident) and Butler v. Washington-Youree Hotel
Co., 160 So. 825 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) (approximately seven hours after
accident).
51. 178 La. 7, 150 So. 386 (1933) (statement made by victim that he had
shot himself held not admissible). See also State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 116 So.
206 (1928) (statement by defendant after defendant had taken deceased to hospital after automobile accident excluded). Civil cases: Holland v. Owners' Auto.
Ins. Co., 155 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (fifteen minutes after automobile
accident).
52. State v. Estoup, 39 La. Ann. 223, 1 So. 448 (1887) (reporting witness
found shooting victim ten minutes after the event, sitting next to his brother-inlaw; but evidence did not show that the victim had made any statement to the
brother-in-law such as that he made to the reporting witness).
53. One Louisiana case explicitly recognizes this principle. In State v. Foley,
113 La. 51, 57, 36 So. 885, 887 (1904), it is stated: "Deliberate design vel non
is the test." Many other cases impliedly recognize the same principle by stating
that there is no absolute time limit for reliability.
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cases in which excited utterances have been admitted, the time
element involved has been less than fifteen minutes and there

was little difficulty in finding that there was only a minimal
risk of fabrication about the startling event,5
and elapsed time were both considered.

4

when excitement

In some cases, it appears that statements are admitted as
excited utterances and then are used as tending to prove the
occurrence of the event itself.5 5 It is clearly circuitous to say

that a statement may enter because of the excitement-when
the only proof of the excitement is the statement. But such a
statement was admitted in Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mosley56 by
the United States Supreme Court, and the practice is said to be
quite common in many jurisdictions.5 7 In Mosley, however, there

were at least some facts other than the statement from which
the court could draw the conclusion that the exciting event had
occurred-Mosley's voice trembled and he appeared to be faint

and in great pain."
In an early criminal case in Louisiana,5 9 the Supreme Court
54. Criminal cases: State v. Jenkins, 236 La. 256, 107 So.2d 632 (1958)
(within minutes after shooting and chase of assailant) ; State v. Leming, 217 La.
257, 46 So.2d 262 (1.950) (minutes after poisoning) ; State v. Mattio, 212 La.
284, 31 So.2d 801 (1947) (within seconds of a stabbing) ; State v. Dale, 200 La.
19, 7 So.2d 371 (1942) (five minutes after shooting) ; State v. Brown, 163 La.
112, 111 So. 617 (five minutes after shooting); State v. Williams, 158 La.
1011, 105 So. 46 (1925) (fifteen minutes) ; State v. Hopkins, 152 La. 1060, 95
So. 221 (1922) (two to three minutes after) ; State v. Robertson, 133 La. 806,
63 So. 363 (191.3) (five minutes) ; State v. Maxey, 107 La. 799, 32 So. 206
(1902) (while running from scene of shooting) ; State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann.
541, 27 So. 129 (1.900) (thirty seconds) ; State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26
So. 390 (1899) (five seconds); State v. Horton, 33 La. Ann. 289 (1881) (at
time of burglary). Civil cases: Mahfouz v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
117 So.2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1.960) (seconds after); Stewart v. Herrin
Transp. Co., 37 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (five minutes after).
Workmen's compensation cases: Butler v. Washington-Youree Hotel Co., 160
So. 825 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) (plaintiff's deceased husband worked the 7:00
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift and was injured sometime after 1 :00 a.m. ; statement in
question was made to his wife sometime after his return home at the end of his
shift). See also Temple v. Martin Veneer Co., 200 So. 676 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1941) (son told father of injury after returning home from work).
55. This most often occurs in workmen's compensation cases where the employee was working alone. Professor Morgan says that in workmen's compensation
cases, the niceties of technical evidence rules such as this usually yield to the
public policy regarding every injury that occurs while a man is employed as prima
facie compensable. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WAsif. L. REV. 91, 100 (1937). Louisiana statutes expressly provide that in workmen's compensation cases courts are
not bound by "technical rules of evidence." See text accompanying note 14 supra.
56. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869).
57. C. McCoRmIcKc, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 272 (1954).
58. Slough, Res Gestae, 2 KAN. L. REV. 246, 254 (1954). Colorado, Kentucky,

Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Nebraska, and North Carolina are among those
states which admit such evidence. Illinois is said to reject it. Morgan, Res Gestae,
12 WAsu. L. REV. 91, 100 (1937).
59. State v. Williams, 108 La. 222, 32 So. 402 (1901).
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held that the statement made by the deceased while suffering
from the gunshot wound that caused his death was erroneously
admitted because his statement, made to his roommate, was the
only proof of the exciting condition. Deceased had come to their
home between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. after the shooting and
stated that defendant had jumped from a slowly moving train
and shot him. The witness could not verify deceased's statement
as to the person who had inflicted the wound, but he could certainly testify from his own observations as to the wound. The
court said:
"The facts by and from which the admissibility of the
statements as res gestae are to be tested, have to be 'testified' to by persons cognizant of them. The admissibility itself of the statements being the very question at issue for
decision, no part of them are to be used for the purpose of

determining

'' °
it. 6

It is submitted that there was evidence other than deceased's
statement of the exciting condition; there was the bullet wound
itself. The only elements not clear were the identity of the assailant and the time elapsed since the shooting. It is submitted
that the court should have found the excited nature of the utterances from the obvious condition of the deceased.
The issue does not appear to have been raised in any subsequent cases, and it is suggested that the admission of such
statements should be at the discretion of the trial judge. Where
he finds other circumstances which indicate that the exciting
event did take place (as in Mosley) so that the risk of unreliability is minimal, the statement should be admitted. And even
where the statement stands alone as evidence of the exciting
event, this should be only one factor in the balancing process by
which the trial judge weighs the risk of fabrication.
The declarant making the excited out-of-court utterances
must, of course, have had the opportunity to observe personally
that of which he speaks in order for it to be admissible.61 Aside
from this requirement, it seems that the excitement of the
moment will overcome most defects of competency. The witness
seems merely a human conduit through which the event makes
itself known.62 Louisiana courts have admitted an excited state60. Id. at 225-26, 32 So. 402, 404 (1901).
61. 6 J. WI2,IORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EviDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1751 (3d ed. 1940).
62. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 272 (1954)
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ment of a felon even when a felony conviction made one incompetent to testify ;63 and building on that authority, admitted the
excited statement of a wife for use against her husband in a
case in which she could not be a competent witness against him."
Excited utterances of children have also been admitted, either
without mention of their age6. or without discussion of their
competency if the age were mentioned. 66
However, Louisiana courts, in keeping with the practice in
most jurisdictions," have continued to apply the opinion rule
to excited utterances, at least nominally. McCormick is critical
of this practice, pointing out that the opinion rule is designed
for in-court use, where a question which asks for an opinion
may be rephrased or simply withdrawn. "But applied to out-ofcourt declarations admitted under the hearsay exceptions the
rule would run counter to the way people naturally talk, and it
should not have a place there."", Louisiana application of the
rule seems limited to those cases in which the statement clearly
expresses an opinion formulated on the basis of facts observed
by the declarant. In one criminal case," 9 the defendant had been
called upon by the sheriff to aid in making an arrest and was
in charge of the prisoner when an escape was attempted. Defendant fired two shots, one of which fatally wounded the prisoner. A bystander immediately said, "I think Murphy has made
a mistake." The statement was excluded as opinion, though made
seconds after the shot was fired.70
In the absence of such a clear example of opinion, Louisiana
courts have not found an undue risk of unreliability. Hybrid
utterances which seem to be statements of fact and yet have
elements of opinion have been admitted. The statement, "if I
had not shown myself so plucky and willing to fight, I would
never have been shot," made by the victim after a shooting, was
held improperly excluded, with no discussion by the Supreme
6

J.

WIGMORE,

A

TREATISE ON

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

63.
64.
65.
66.

State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.
v.

TlE

ANGLO-AmERICAN

SYSTEM

OF EVIDENCE

IN

§ 1751 (3d ed. 1940). See LA. R.S. 15:447 (1950).

Dellwood, 33 La. Ann. 1229 (1881).
Pilcher, 158 La. 791, 104 So. 717 (1925).
Moore, 38 La. Ann. 66 (1886).
Brown, 163 La. 112, 111 So. 617 (1927).

67. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK

OF TlE

LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 272

(1954).

68. Id.
69. State v. Murphy, 170 La. 398, 127 So. 881 (1930).
70. It is important to note that the bystander who spoke had been clerk of
court and sheriff, and the Supreme Court felt that he was familiar with the respective rights of law officers and prisoners. Therefore, the bystander's statement
was intended to announce his belief that the defendant had made a mistake as to
his lawful powers as custodian of the prisoner when he shot the prisoner.
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Court of the opinion rule.71 In another case, the statement, "I am
shot through and through, and if I had listened to you this
would not have happened" was given in evidence without ob72
jection by counsel.
It should be noted that in rape cases, Louisiana courts as
well as courts elsewhere 7 seem to have accepted statements in
which the risk of fabrication was more than minimal. Statements of the rape victim immediately after the event are generally held admissible, as well as particulars given by her to the
officer who takes her complaint concerning the event.74 An early
Louisiana case limited admissible statements in rape cases to
those made almost contemporaneously with the event,7 5 but this
holding was soon modified by throwing the broad cloak of res
gestae over the problem.76 Fortunately, there are some limitations; statements made by the victim two or three days after
the alleged assault, in further explanation of the incident to
the victim's mother, have been excluded.7 7 The reasons behind
the special treatment in rape cases are difficult to explain, but
perhaps the courts feel that the event is so shocking and devastating to the victim that her excited condition is likely to last
for a greater length of time; and the risk of fabrication may
remain minimal because of the prolongation of the excited
condition.
It is sometimes held elsewhere in the United States that an
excited utterance which is "self-serving" in nature is to be automatically excluded.75 But the prevailing view is that the selfserving aspect of the statement is not conclusive and should
be used merely as a factor in the trial judge's measurement of
71. State v. Molisse, 38 La. Ann. 381 (1886).
72. State v. Lively, 119 La. 363, 44 So. 128 (1907). Counsel objected 'only
when the witness was asked to explain what the deceased meant by the statement. The Supreme Court said this objection was improperly sustained; the
unobjected-to statement was useless without further explanation.
73. 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AmEaIcAN SYsTE-M OF EviDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1761 (3d ed. 1940).
74. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954) ; cf. State v. Watson,
159 La. 779, 106 So. 302 (1925).
75. State v. Robertson, 38 La. Ann. 618 (1886).
76. State v. Langford, 45 La. Ann. 1177, 14 So. 181 (1893). Cf. the statement by Justice McCaleb in his concurring opinion in State v. Watson, 247 La.
102, 112, 170 So.2d 107, 110 (1964), an aggravated rape case: "I think the objections to the testimony of the police officers were properly overruled as the
statements of these persons, having 'been given within two or three hours of the
commission of the offense, formed part of the res gestae."
77. State v. Cole, 145 La. 900, 83 So. 184 (1919) ; cf. State v. Collins, 242
La. 704, 138 So.2d 546 (1962), a rape case in which pictures of the victim in
the hospital with her head shaved to reveal bruises and cuts from the struggle
were admitted as part of the res gestae.
78. Fischer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 193 Minn. 73, 258 N.W. 4 (1934).
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the risk of fabrication."0 The Louisiana courts do not appear to
have taken a clear position on excited utterances which appear
to be self-serving. It is submitted that Louisiana should follow
the prevailing view elsewhere and treat the self-serving aspects
of the statement as one more factor for the discretion of the
trial judge in weighing the risk that the statement may be
unreliable.
PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS

The exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule recognized
in a few jurisdictions of present sense impressions may be traced
to the suggestions of Professors Thayer and Morgan."' The suggested definition provided by the Uniform Rules of Evidence
represents the prevailing view of the nature of the exception:
a statement "which the judge finds was made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement
narrates, describes or explains" may be admitted.-' There is no
requirement that the event be of a startling nature."2
Such statements are necessary and reliable for reasons very
similar to those advanced in the discussion on excited utterances, but with slight differences. As with excited utterances,
one cannot recapture the moment at which the declarant spoke
and thus a witness's report of his statement at the time is necessary. And the risk of fabrication is low because such statements are made in the presence of the reporting witness "who
would have equal opportunities to observe and hence to check a
misstatement." ' 3 This witness may then be cross-examined concerning the event itself as well as the utterance which he is
reporting; and the truth of the out-of-court utterances would
not depend solely upon the veracity of the declarant. The risk
of fabrication is further minimized by the fact that there are no
problems of defect of memory of the witness nor of elapsed
time. 4 It will be seen that unless absolute contemporaneity is
79. C. McCoRmICiK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 272 (1954).
80. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922); Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as
a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV. 71, 83 (1881). Wigmore insists on
excitement as the guarantee of reliability and seems to reject the exception altogether. 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1757 (3d ed. 1940).
81. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(4) (a)
(1953).

82. Note, 8 INTRA. L. REV. 115, 116 (1953).
83. C. McCoRMICIc, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 273 (1954). See
also Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae,

31 YALE I.J. 229, 236 (1922).
84. Id.
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insisted upon, as is the case in the Uniform Rules, the founda5
tions of minimal risk of fabrication are clearly weakened.
It should be noted that some writers feel the present sense
impression presents a lower risk of unreliability and inaccuracy
than the excited utterance. The impairment of perception produced by excitement is no longer present and yet spontaneity is.
"With emotion absent, speed present, and the person who heard
the declaration on hand to be cross-examined, we appear to have
an ideal exception to the hearsay rule."8 6 In light of this statement, it is remarkable that so few courts have discussed and
directly accepted the exception.
The classic example of a statement admitted under this exs7
ception appears in the case of Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis.
In that case, an automobile filled with people including the
plaintiff collided with defendant's truck. On appeal, defendant
challenged the exclusion by the trial judge of a statement made
by a Mrs. Cooper before the accident occurred. Mrs. Cooper
testified that the car in which plaintiff was riding passed her
headed in the same direction, four or five miles from the scene
of the later collision. Other evidence was offered to show that
the car was going at a high rate of speed and was zig-zagging.
As the car passed, Mrs. Cooper said to those with her, "they
must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on
the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up." Her statement, as reported by another occupant of her car, was excluded
by the trial court, but this was deemed error by the appellate
court.
The reviewing court felt that the statement of Mrs. Cooper
was "sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of
being manufactured evidence." ss While the statement did not
come within the traditional excited utterance exception because
it did not have the safeguards of impulse, emotion or excitement, the court (citing a text by McCormick) felt there were
85. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236-37 (1922). Accordingly, some courts have applied
more rigid standards of elapsed time in these cases than in the excited utterance
cases where it might be found that the excitement had been prolonged by unusual
circumstances.
86. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COLUM. L. REv. 432, 439 (1928) : Further, "the best evidence of all is a statement made in immediate response to an external stimulus which produces no
shock or nervous excitement whatever."
87. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
88. Id. at 6, 161 S.W. 2d at 476.
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other safeguards-no defect of memory, no lapse of time, and
verification by the reporting witness s 9
Similar statements have been admitted under the exception
for present sense impressions in a limited number of jurisdictions since 1942.90 For example, the observation of a lineman on
the condition of a particular circuit, that it was open, made
before he anticipated injury and before he was electrocuted, was
admitted."1
The courts which have admitted present sense impressions
as an exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule do not seem to
have imposed any requirement that the declarant be a competent witness, other than that the declarant have had an opportunity to observe the event or condition of which he speaks.92
There would seem to be no reason for divergence here from the
practice followed in admitting excited utterances without questioning the competency of the out-of-court declarant; once again,
the event or condition provides the stimulus for the statement,
and the declarant's competency does not seem to be a conclusive
factor.93 The declarant's competency should be only one element
of the trial judge's measurement of the risk of fabrication in
the statement.
However, courts which recognize an exception for present
sense impressions do not apply the opinion rule to the out-ofcourt utterance, as is true of the treatment by some courts of
excited utterances. Present sense impressions very often an89.

Id.; see Comment, 21 TEX. L. REV. 298 (1943).
90. McCormick mentions some applications even prior to 1942: Kelly v.
Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269 (1934) ('bystander's statement that he heard
car coming and that at the speed at which it was traveling it could not make the
curve) ; Sellers v. Montana-Dakota Power Co., 99 Mont. 39, 41 P.2d 44 (1935)
(remarks by persons in burning building as to smell of smoke, indicating that the
fire came from gas). He lists an equal number of cases which are contra. C.
McCoRfICK,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 273 (1954).

91. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 10 So.2d 83 (1942). See also
Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943) (statement made as 'two racing trucks passed the declarant more than two blocks from
the scene of the subsequent accident, "Golly, look there; those trucks are going
to kill somebody yet."; admitted as exception to hearsay exclusionary rule) ; see
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 I-HAv. L. REV. 481, 576 (1946) ;
cf. I-leg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 Wash. 252, 197 P. 51 (1921) (statement
to others in speeding car, "I am in no hurry," admissible in testimony of declarant now in court on the stand), discussed in Slough, Res Gestae, 2 KAN. L. REv.
246, 269 (1954).
92. Other competency questions should go to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility. Cf. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TIHE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 226 (1954), and text accompanying note 61 supra.
93. 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON TIE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYsTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1751 (3d ed. 1940).
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nounce opinions, and the courts have not seen the opinion aspect
of such statements as creating an undue risk of unreliability. 4
The writer could find no Louisiana cases rejecting a statement of a present sense impression as not being an exception to
the hearsay exclusionary rule; there seem to be no cases which
even discuss the matter.95 It is submitted that in a proper case,
Louisiana should recognize a separate exception to the hearsay
rule for statements made while the declarant was perceiving
an event or condition, when the trial judge finds in his discretion that the contemporaneous nature of such statements, balanced with other factors such as the competency of the declarant
and the expression of opinion in the statement, makes the risk
of fabrication acceptably minimal.
THE FUTURE OF THE EXCEPTIONS

Despite the foregoing analysis, there will remain some hearsay statements which fall on the fringe of one of these exceptions
or in between the two. Suppose two children, Tom and Dick,
thirteen years of age, are out on a trick-or-treat expedition Halloween night. They are approached by a man who identifies
himself as Tom's uncle from Mississippi, whom Tom has never
seen. Tom's uncle says he just arrived in town and was sent
by Tom's parents to bring him home because of the late hour.
Tom gets into the "uncle's" car and his companion returns to
his home. When Tom does not return to his home at the appointed hour, Tom's parents telephone Dick's home to locate
Tom. Dick answers the telephone and repeats the incident to
Tom's mother. The "uncle" is later arrested and charged with
kidnapping. At the trial, the state seeks to introduce the testimony of Tom's mother as to what Dick (now deceased) told her
about the incident. The state argues that Dick's statement is an
excited utterance and thus an exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule. Under the circumstances, Dick's out-of-court statement is necessary. But is the risk of unreliability so great that
it should be excluded?
94. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 141 Fla. 558, 10 So.2d 83 (1942) (opinion
of lineman that circuit was open) ; Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C.
318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943) (opinion that trucks would "kill somebody yet");
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942) (opinion that
passengers in car were drunk, and that they would be found "wrecked" up the
road) ; Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 576

(1946).

95. But in this regard, see State v. Pilcher, 158 La. 791, 104 So. 717 (1925)
for an interesting discussion concerning an out-of-court statement made by a wife
during the course of a search of her husband's premises.

680

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

One can hardly maintain that Dick's excitement at seeing
Tom get into the car of someone believed by both Tom and Dick

to be Tom's uncle was so great that it would not have abated
one hour later. 96 Thus the risk of fabrication in such a statement may well be unacceptably large. The statement is clearly
not one of a present sense impression. There would appear to be
no recognized exception to the hearsay rule under which Dick's
statement may be admitted.
There are suggested exceptions, however, which might per-

mit the admission of such statements at the discretion of the
trial judge. If "the declarant is unavailable as a witness," the
Uniform Rules would permit the admission of "a statement
narrating, describing or explaining an event or condition which
the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time when the
matter has been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the com-

mencement of the action."97
The broad range of such a proposed exception vests great

discretion in the trial judge and may result in substantial liberalization of the hearsay exclusionary rule. 98 But it is submitted
96. And one cannot say that such an occurrence is so out of the ordinary
that a child would be precluded from fabricating details about it. In State v.
Hutchison, 222 Ore. 533, 353 P.2d 1047 (1960), the unusual character of the
occurrence (sexual attack) and the very young age of the child involved were apparently the deciding factors in determining that the risk of fabrication was small.
97. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63(4) (c) (1953). The Uniform Rules
do not limit the unavailability requirement only to death, but recognize "real
unavailability for any cause." Id. comment. Massachusetts has had a similar
statute since 1898, providing that in civil cases "a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the Court finds that it was
made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant." Mass. Acts 1898, ch. 535, now found in 8 MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1956). See C. McCORMICK, IIAND3OOK OF THE, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 303 (1954).
98. Such liberalization of hearsay exceptions seems very much in vogue.
However, it is necessary to interject a brief caveat as to liberalization. In the
recent case of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the United States Supreme
Court held that defendants in state court trials are protected by the sixth amendment's guarantee of confrontation of the witnesses against them. Specifically, the
Court held that a statement given by a witness at a preliminary hearing at which
defendant was not represented -by counsel could not be introduced against him
at the trial itself, even though the prior declarant be unavailable. The basis for
the Court's decision seemed to be that to admit such statements would deny the
defendant his right of cross-examination in court; and that this right was so
fundamental to a system of ordered justice that to foreclose it would be to deny
the defendant due process of law. Id. at 405; cf. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 472-73 (1965) : "In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case
necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is
full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel." It should be remembered that the major objection to all
hearsay evidence is that the out-of-court declarant is not on the stand and not
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that the same test of measurement of the risk of fabrication is
at the core of this exception as well. The trial judge will have
neither excitement nor absolute contemporaneity to minimize
the danger of unreliability, and thus the balance may often tip
toward exclusion. In a statement such as Dick's the judge should
consider Dick's youth, the nature of the occurrence, and the time
elapsed since the event. If under all the circumstances, the trial
judge can still determine that the risk of fabrication is very
small and the out-of-court declaration is validly unavailable,
then the statement should be admitted.
The rules of evidence in Louisiana in the area of excited
utterances and present sense impressions are largely judgemade, developed within the structure of applicable statutes.
There would seem to be no reason why that development cannot
continue its progress toward clarity and consistency by careful
analysis of the recognized exceptions for excited utterances and
present sense impressions.
H. Alston Johnson III*

LOUISIANA'S PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACTS
Professional corporations are of coming importance in Louisiana due to the passage of the Louisiana Legal and Medical
Corporation Acts' and to the significant tax advantages which
gave impetus to their passage. Certain tax advantages accrue to
professionals practicing as employees rather than as owners.
These relate to (1) social security, 2 (2) tax deferring pension
subject to cross-examination; and the court has placed great emphasis recently
upon the importance of cross-examination. Though the Court recognizes that dying
declarations and testimony of deceased witnesses who had testified at a former
trial have been admitted against an accused, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407
(1965), its emphasis on the importance of cross-examination in court should
sound a warning signal to those who seek extension of hearsay exceptions.
* The writer wishes to express appreciation to Mr. James D. Davis of the
Alexandria bar for the use of a helpful seminar paper in the field of excited

utterances and a present sense impression written while a student at LSU Law
School.
1. Professional Law Corporation Act, LA. R.S. 12:801-815 (Supp. 1969)
Professional Medical Corporation Act, LA. R.S. 12:901-915 (Supp. 1969).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 3101-3121. There is no difference between Social Security benefits and those payable under Self-Employment provisions. However, the rates of contribution are lower under Social Security. Compare id.

§§ 3101 and 3111 with §§ 1401 and 1402(b) (1)(C).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 401-407. Under amendment to the above sections it is possible for partnerships to get this -tax advantage to a limited degree.
This is commonly called a "H.R. 10 plan." The amendment makes a distinction
between an owner-employee (one who owns more than 10% of the business) and

